idea re: the following prior to this read...

1. Adm.King really sat on -and even to some extent- pressured Nimitz,
Pye, Fletcher, and Halsey to go do something about it. (i.e. about Pearl).

There is a very weighty influence of Adm.King behind everything up through
Guadalcanal give/take.

He sure knew when to press just hard enough. Gotta give him that round 10-8.

(tho' everything else says he was a true lecherous person-- a home and
subordinate career wrecker to the wimminzing extreme)

Tho' he knew how to get back up and piss right on the other side
after being knocked down. Just a very scary guy in several dimensions.

2. I had no idea just how close japan was to going after the lower Solomons
all the way down to French Caledonia. And even easterly @Fiji et al after that.

MOST of their naval staff wanted that until yamamoto came in for the Midway plan.

i.e. this is a much longer/harder war if all 6 of their 1st Air Fleet (kidō butai) carriers are still
alive/afloat and they do go cut Australia virtually 100% off from the USofA shipping-lanes.

If yamamoto had only listened, we, Australia and the Kiwis had precious little up to
not a lot down there to check them. Much less stop them.

3. REALLY strong read on how meticulous/hard we studied for every battle.
With no real ships left to waste... nothing was left to waste much less chance.

Nimitz and Staff were aces here.
(ditto our noticeable to nearly more than that superior code-crackers)
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Tho' still yet... the imperial japanese navy goes all the way down the slot and they
may add a year to the war. Maybe 15-18 months.

Really bad/slow-death type of move to not do so in hindsight.


b.street